Gathers the pre-Sand Country Almanac writings of Aldo Leopold, showing that he was not born an ecologist, but evolved over time through experimentation and thought.

Leopold first discusses the conservation of natural resources in the southwestern United States in economic tenns, stressing, in particular, erosion and aridity. He then concludes his analysis with a discussion of the moral issues involved, developing his general position within the context of P. D. Ouspenky’s early philosophy of organism.

Consciousness and Qualia is a philosophical study of qualitative consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, experienced colors, sounds, etc.

Both individually and as a collection, these essays will promote understanding and provoke further debate amongst students and established scholars alike.

Leopold Flam (1912-1995) woont voor een groot deel van zijn jeugd in een kelder in Antwerpen. Zijn ouders, Joodse mensen die uit Lublin naar België emigreerden, kunnen lezen noch schrijven, en proberen aan de kost te komen met leuren en bedelen. Op zijn dertiende begint Flam met het bijhouden van een even openhartig als meedogenloos dagboek. Socrates indachtig heeft hij het vaste voornemen zichzelf te leren kennen. Het mag een klein mirakel heten dat Leopold Flam in zijn opzet is geslaagd. (...) Hij overleefde de Holocaust en hij, de bedelaarszoon, werd hoogleraar filosofie. Hij publiceerde artikelen en boeken, maar zijn dagboeken - voor zover bewaard - behoren tot zijn sterkste werk. Ze vormen een aangrijpend epos dat ons de mens Flam laat zien, eerder dan de filosoof. Tegelijkertijd bieden ze een verhelderend tijdsdocument, met onder meer concrete informatie over zijn hulp aan Joden tijdens de Duitse bezetting en notities gemaakt terwijl hij gevangenzat in Buchenwald. Ondanks de vooroordelen en vervolging waarmee hij had af te rekenen, bleef hij geloven in zijn weg uit de duisternis naar het licht."--Publisher information. (shrink)

Le dualisme de Kant doit être remplacé par une différenciation plus subtile. L’indéterminisme n’est plus pour nous notion contradictoire du déterminisme ; la norme, individuelle ou sociale, ne doit plus être dépourvue de tout élément empirique. Connexion du déterminisme avec le rationalisme : le « rationalisme interventionniste » prouve l’impossibilité d’un point de vue radical. En un sens modifié, le moment indéterministe demeure et se conserve dans la pensée normative ; même les normes apparemment déterministes de Nietzsche n’en sont pas (...) moins libres. La norme sociale n’est pas possible sans une hiérarchie des connexes, et celle-ci a pour prémisse un pluralisme des sphères ontiques, dont le heurt représente le moment indéterministe. La détermination intégrale, elle, tient, au contraire, de la métaphysique. (shrink)

Correspondence should be addressed to David A. Leopold [email protected] the viewing of certain patterns, widely known as ambiguous or puzzle figures, perception lapses into a sequence of spontaneous alternations, switching every few seconds between two or more visual interpretations of the stimulus. Although their nature and origin remain topics of debate, these stochastic switches are generally thought to be the automatic and inevitable consequence of viewing a pattern without a unique solution. We report here that in humans such perceptual alternations (...) can be slowed, and even brought to a standstill, if the visual stimulus is periodically removed from view. We also show, with a visual illusion, that this stabilizing effect hinges on perceptual disappearance rather than on actual removal of the stimulus. These findings indicate that uninterrupted subjective perception of an ambiguous pattern is required for the initiation of the brain-state changes underlying multistable vision.Visual perception involves coordination between sensory sampling of the world and active interpretation of the sensory data. Human perception of objects and scenes is normally stable and robust, but it falters when one is presented with patterns that are inherently ambiguous or contradictory. Under such conditions, vision lapses into a chain of continually alternating percepts, whereby a viable visual interpretation dominates for a few seconds and is then replaced by a rival interpretation. This multistable vision, or 'multistability', is thought to result from destabilization of fundamental visual mechanisms, and has offered valuable insights into how sensory patterns are actively organized and interpreted in the brain1, 2. Despite a great deal of recent research and interest in multistable perception, however, its neurophysiological underpinnings remain poorly understood. Physiological studies have suggested that disambiguation of ambiguous patterns. (shrink)

Given the apparent nondisplaceability and noncancellability of the derogatory content of slurs, it may appear puzzling that non-derogatory uses of slurs exist. Moreover, these uses seem to be in general available only to in-group speakers, thereby exhibiting a peculiar kind of context-sensitivity. In this paper the author argues that to understand non-derogatory uses we should consider slurs in terms of the kind of social practice their uses instantiate. A suitable theory of social practices has been proposed by McMillan. In typical (...) uses the practice is one of bigotry and discrimination. Non-derogatory uses are only possible to the extent that they consitute acts of an alternative, non-derogatory practice. In the core cases it must be a subversive practice of satire or reappropriation. The social identity of speakers is not an ultimately decisive factor but it is an important constitutive condition: most non-derogatory practices of slur-use can only be performed by a member of the target group. (shrink)

Leopold first discusses the conservation of natural resources in the southwestern United States in economic tenns, stressing, in particular, erosion and aridity. He then concludes his analysis with a discussion of the moral issues involved, developing his general position within the context of P. D. Ouspenky’s early philosophy of organism.

In order to contribute to the consolidation in the field ofPositive Psychology, we reinvestigated the factor structure of top 10 positive emotions of Barbara Fredrickson. Former research in experimental settings resulted in a three-cluster solution, which we tested withexploratoryandconfirmatorymethodology against different factor models. Within our non-experimental data (N= 312), statistical evidence is presented, advocating for a single factor model of the 10 positive emotions. Different possible reasons for the deviating results are discussed, as well as the theoretical significance to various (...) subfields inPositive Psychology(e.g., therapeutical interventions). Furthermore, the special role ofawewithin the study and its implications for further research in the field are discussed. (shrink)

In Sino-Theology and the Philosophy of History Leopold Leeb presents the ideas of an influential Chinese intellectual, Liu Xiaofeng, whose approach to the question of a Christian theology for China is both controversial and inspiring.

“utopophobia” is a diverse and long-established phenomenon. Recent discussion of the notion of “realism” in political philosophy has illuminated one form that the fear of utopia can take—namely, suspicion and disapproval of normative standards that are unlikely ever to be achieved—but has not exhausted all that is of interest here.1 The present paper is concerned with a different variety of utopophobia: namely, the historically influential but not well-understood hostility of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels toward the provision of plans and (...) blueprints of the ideal society of the future.2There seems little doubt about the existence of this Marxian utopophobia. (Note that I use the.. (shrink)

Most accounts of the derogatory meaning of slurs are semantic. Recently, Nunberg proposed a purely pragmatic account offering a compelling picture of the relation between derogatory content and social context. Nunberg posits that the semantic content of slurs is identical to that of neutral counterparts, and that derogation is a result of the association of slur use with linguistic conventions of bigoted speakers. The mechanism responsible for it is a special kind of conversational implicature. However, this paper argues that Nunberg’s (...) proposal suffers from technical and conceptual problems regarding the application of the concepts of implicature and convention. It is proposed that the implicature mechanism should be replaced by expressive commitment attribution. The account advocated here preserves crucial insights of Nunberg’s analysis, 25–48, 2013a, Analytic Philosophy 54, 350–363, 2013b; Bolinger Nous, 51, 439–462, 2017), giving them a firmer conceptual basis. It supports a distinction between derogation and offensiveness of slurs that improves on the one proposed by Hom and May, 293–313 2013), and sheds light on puzzling borderline cases: the use of slurs by ignorant speakers and controversies surrounding the status of some words as potentially slurs. (shrink)

Excerpt from Rechtsphilosophie als Naturlehre des Rechts 9b nun Diefe csigentbun1li(R)ieit Deß %uebeß a18 ein %drgug ober alé ein gebler Deflelben 511 betraeb ten bleibt Der @ntfebeibung Deé seeferö üb111affen (c)aß Die fi81'fi'enfeb11ft Deß s)raturreebtß feit einem 3abr sebent i1n 3ui'tande einer Strii'iß fieb befindet, werden alle, Die Sieb mit D11felben befebäftigen, {eben Iangi't wifi'en. (c)ie auf Der %afiß Der fantifeben %bilofobbie aufgebauten (c)bi'ten1e Deffelbem;;baben Daß am 2111 {eben verloren; Der Dureb jene'ßbilofopbie Dem sratur reebte vorgegeiebnete. Rreiß iii Durcbfaufen. Febnt (...) Sieb von alien (R)eiten naeb 9?euen1. 91b11 notb ift 15 Feiner iibeorie gelungen, g11allgemeiner 91nerfen: nung 511 gelangen. Sie begeifebe 9?eebtépbiißfopbie wird nur von Den %inbängern ibrer (c)ebule geprie fen; in (c)tablö nii)bilbfbbbi1 deé.sreobtä naeb ge febiebtlieber' 21nfiebh ift Der Fritifebe $bei[ n1eifierbaft, Der Dogrnatifebe weniger befriebigend. (c)eir Dem @1 febein1n' Diefeé fiberfeä ii't ein gewifi'er (R)tilli'iand in Der %ea1beitung Diefer fibifienfebaft eingetreten; in. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Bruno Bauer (1809–1882) is neither a well known nor an easily accessible author.1 Despite playing a significant role in both the evolution of Hegelianism and in nineteenth century controversies abo...

This chapter discusses the account of ideology found in the writings of Karl Marx, and its fate in the subsequent Marxist tradition. Marx understood ideology as consisting of certain social ideas which periodically dominate in class-divided societies. More precisely, ideology was characterized as having a particular epistemological standing, social origin, and class function. In the subsequent Marxist tradition that ‘critical’ account was often displaced by non-critical, predominately ‘descriptive’, accounts of ideology. This historical pattern is exemplified by the writings of Antonio (...) Gramsci and Louis Althusser. This displacement of critical by descriptive accounts is portrayed as regrettable, not least because it involves a loss of the explanatory purchase and emancipatory potential found in Marx’s original account. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION It is a commonplace to observe that the left-Hegelian Max Stirner is little-known.gure in the history of political and philosophical thought. However, that obscurity should not be exaggerated. The author of Der Einzige und sein Eigentum is not only familiar to certain rather specialised and largely academic circles-those with an interest in Hegelianism, for example, or in the early intellectual development of Karl Marx -he is also, and more widely, known as a member of, and in.uence upon, the anarchist (...) tradition. Stirner's best-known work is often excerpted in anthologies of anarchist writings, and his name is regularly included as part of the modern pantheon in historically orientated surveys of anarchist thought. (shrink)

In this paper I describe the place of naive realism in Russell’s changing accounts of perception. I argue ‎for the following conclusions: (1) The early period, 1898-1910: I am inclined to think that the naïve ‎realism that Russell embraced so enthusiastically early on may not have been intended as a naïve ‎realism about perception, but as a metaphysical or semantical thesis. (2) The Problems of Philosophy ‎‎(1912): Russell abandons naïve realism (if, in fact, he ever held it) and presents a (...) sense-datum version ‎of representative realism. (3) “On Matter” (1912): here we see Russell’s best attempt to defend ‎something very close to the standard doctrine of naïve realism. The objects of perception—the ‎‎“everyday material objects such as caterpillars and Cadillacs”—have, of course, undergone severe ‎reconstruction. But the resulting picture does capture the spirit of the doctrine. (4) The period from ‎‎1914 to 1927: though Russell’s thinking about perception underwent some significant changes during ‎this period—the sense datum theory is replaced by neutral monism—I try to show that the ‎distinction between the matter of physics and the thing of common sense is a constant feature of ‎Russell’s changing views. And I suggest that our perceptual relation the thing of common ‎sense (as logically reconstructed by Russell) can usefully be viewed as a limited sort of naïve realism. ‎‎(5) The period after 1927: the thing of common sense no longer features in Russell’s account of our ‎perceptual access to the world. The things we perceive are percepts, located in our private spaces. The ‎only material objects of which these percepts are parts are our brains. All other material objects are ‎beyond our perceptual reach and are accessible only via inference. This is the end of anything ‎resembling the traditional view of naïve realism in Russell’s account of perception. ‎. (shrink)